Help Pseudo-Palestinians Emigrate


John R. Houk

© June 13, 2017

 

It has always been my opinion that a Two-State Solution would NEVER be a harbinger for peace between Israel and the Arabs that call themselves Palestinians. A Palestinian State would merely be a launching ground for Islamic terrorist attacks against Israel. The result would be Israeli military incursions to punish an independent Palestine for allowing the terrorist launching pads. Or an independent Palestine might have the hutzpah claim the terrorism is military incursions for whatever fake/false reason given.

 

The only raison d’être for a Palestinian State existence would be to end Israel’s existence and to kill Jews. Because of Muslim animus against Israel, a One-State Solution is the best solution.

 

The best One-State Solution is to find a way to move Jew-hating Muslims out of any area that is a part of ancient Jewish heritage.

 

Dr. Martin Sherman has written a two-part essay touching on the logistics and feasibility of an ethical fashion to aid Jew-hating Muslims to emigrate to another Arab-Muslim nation. I found out about Dr. Sherman’s from the Facebook Group “No Palestinian State!” (If you are a Pro-Israel kind of person you should go there and request to be a member and add to the discussion.)

 

The title is “INTO THE FRAY: The Humanitarian Paradigm – Answering FAQs”. You can read the 6/2/17 Part One HERE. Part Two is cross posted below.

 

JRH 6/13/17

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INTO THE FRAY: The Humanitarian Paradigm – Answering FAQs (Part 2)

 

Sequel to the dispelling of doubts regarding the feasibility – and morality – of largescale, financially incentivized emigration as the only non-kinetic approach for resolution of the Israel-Palestinian impasse.

 

By Dr. Martin Sherman

June 9, 2017 06:48

Israel National News – Arutz Sheva 7

 

The pessimist sees difficulty in every opportunity. The optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty. -attributed to Winston Churchill

 

Readers will recall that last week I began a two part response to FAQs (Frequently Asked Questions) relating to the practical feasibility/moral acceptability of my proposed Humanitarian Paradigm (HP), which prescribes, among other measures, large-scale financially incentivized emigration of the Palestinian-Arabs, living across the pre-1967 lines as the only route to attain long-term survivability for Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

 

To recap briefly

 

In last week’s column, I addressed the question of the overall cost of the funded emigration project, and showed that, given the political will to implement it, it would be eminently affordable – even if Israel had to shoulder the burden alone. If other industrial nations could be induced to participate, the total cost would be an imperceptible percentage of their GDP.

 

I then went on to demonstrate that there is ample evidence indicating a wide-spread desire in large sections of the Palestinian-Arab population to emigrate permanently in search of more secure and prosperous live elsewhere. This point was underscored by a recent Haaretz article, describing how thousands of Gazans had fled their home to Greece, undertaking perilous risk to extricate themselves from the harrowing hardships imposed on them by the ill-conceived endeavor to foist statehood on the Palestinian-Arabs.  Significantly, according to the Haaretz report, none of them blamed Israel for their plight—but rather the ruling Hamas-regime, which, it will be recalled, was elected by popular vote to replace the rival Fatah faction, ousted because of its corruption and poor governance.

 

Finally, I dealt with the question of the prospective host nations, pointing out that the funded Palestinian-Arab émigrés would not arrive as an uncontrolled deluge of destitute humanity, but as an orderly regulated stream of relatively affluent immigrants spread over about a decade-and-a-half, whose absorption would entail significant capital inflows for the host nation’s economy.  Moreover, given the fact that, globally, migrants total almost a quarter billion, Palestinian-Arab migration of several hundred thousand a year would comprise a small fraction of one percent of the overall number—hardly an inconceivable prospect.

 

Following this short summary of previously addressed FAQs, we can now move on to tackle several additional ones.

FAQ 4: Won’t fear of fratricide deter recipients?

 

One of the most commonly raised reservations as to the practical applicability of the HP is that potential recipients of the relocation/rehabilitation grants would be deterred from accepting them because of threats of retribution from their kin-folk who allegedly would view such action as perfidious betrayal of the Palestinian-Arabs’ national aspirations.

 

In contending with this question, it is necessary to distinguish between two possible scenarios, in which such internecine intimidation will be either a phenomenon whose scope is (a) limited; or (b) wide-spread and pervasive.

 

Clearly, if the former is true, it is unlikely to have any significant inhibiting impact on the conduct of prospective recipients of the relocation/rehabilitation grants.

 

If, however, the assumption is that the latter is the case, several points need to be made:

– If this objection to the HP is to have any credence, its proponents must present evidence (as opposed to unproven supposition) that potential violent opponents of the HP program have the ability not only to inflict harm on prospective recipients (as opposed to issuing empty threats), but that they can sustain such ability over time.

– In this regard, it should be kept in mind that implementation of the HP entails the disarming, dismantling and disbanding —if need be, coercively—of the ruling Palestinian regime, and reinstating Israeli governance over all territory under Palestinian-Arab control.

Inhibiting internecine intimidation

 

The HP is hardly unique with regard to this latter point. All other proffered policy alternatives for the failed, foolhardy two-state formula entail such measures—either by explicit stipulation, or implicit inference—since preserving the current Palestinian regime intact would clearly preclude their implementation.  Indeed, they are even endorsed by some pundits who do not discount the eventual emergence of a Palestinian state, such as Middle East Forum president, Daniel Pipes.

 

Clearly, the dispersal of the central Palestinian governing body, together with the defanging of its armed organs and the deployment of Israeli forces in their stead, will greatly curtail (although not entirely eliminate) the scope for internecine intimidation and the capacity to dissuade potential recipients of the relocation/rehabilitation grants from availing themselves of the funds.

 

In addition, Israel should task its own formidable military and intelligence services to protect prospective recipients of these grants by identifying, intervening and thwarting attempts to intimidate those seeking to enhance their lives by extricating themselves from the control of the disastrously dysfunctional regime under which they live.

 

Moreover, the international community should be called upon to cooperate with and participate in this principled endeavor to prevent fratricidal elements within Palestinian society from depriving their brethren of the opportunity of better, safer lives. After all, violence against Palestinian-Arabs, who choose to reside within any given host nation, would comprise an intolerable violation of that country’s national sovereignty.

 

Appalling indictment of “Palestinian” society?

  

Of course invoking the specter of large-scale fratricide as an impediment to the acceptance of the HP is an appalling indictment of Palestinian-Arab society.

 

After all, the inescapable implication of such an objection to the HP’s practical applicability is that its acceptance by otherwise willing recipients, wishing to avail themselves of opportunity to seek security and prosperity elsewhere, can only be impeded by violent extortion of their kin-folk.

 

Accordingly, if the concern over large-scale fratricide is serious, it is in fact, at once, both the strongest argument in favor of the HP and against the establishment of a Palestinian state.  After all, two unavoidable conclusions necessarily flow from it: (a) any predicted reluctance to accept the relocation/rehabilitating grants would not be a reflection of the free will of Palestinian-Arabs, but rather a coerced outcome that came about despite the fact that it is not; (b) Similarly, the endeavor for a Palestinian state is not one that manifests any authentic desire of the “Palestinian people” but rather one imposed on them, despite the fact that it does not.

 

As a result, any Palestinian-Arab state established under the pervasive threat of lethal retribution against any dissenter will not be an expression of genuine national aspirations but of extortion and coercion of large segments of Palestinian-Arab society, who would otherwise opt for an alternative outcome.

 

In summation then, if the fear of fratricide can be shown to be a tangible threat, it should not be considered a reason to abandon the HP formula. Quite the opposite! It should be considered an unacceptable phenomenon to be resolutely suppressed –by both Israel and the international community—in order to permit the Palestinian-Arab public the freedom of choice to determine their future.

 

FAQ 5: Would funded emigration not be considered unethical “ethnic cleansing”?

I have addressed the question of the moral merits of the HP extensively elsewhere (see “Palestine”: Who Has Moral High Ground?), where I demonstrate that the HP blueprint will be the most humane of all options if it succeeds, and the least inhumane if it does not.

 

I shall therefore refrain from repeating much of the arguments presented previously and focus on one crucial issue: The comparative moral merits of the widely endorsed two-state paradigm (TSS) and those of my proposed Humanitarian Paradigm (HP).

 

Since there is very little doubt (or dispute) as to the domestic nature of any prospective Palestinian state, anyone seeking to disqualify the HP because of its alleged moral shortcomings must be forced to contend with the following question: Who has the moral high-ground?

 

(a) The TSS-proponents, who advocate establishing (yet another) homophobic, misogynistic Muslim-majority tyranny, whose hallmarks would be: gender discrimination, gay persecution, religious intolerance, and political oppression of dissidents? ; or

 

(b) The HP-proponents who advocate providing non-belligerent Palestinian individuals with the opportunity of building a better life for themselves elsewhere, out of harm’s way, free from the recurring cycles of death, destruction and destitution, brought down on them by the cruel, corrupt cliques that have led them astray for decades.

 

Furthermore, TSS advocates should be compelled to clarify why they consider it morally acceptable to offer financial inducements to Jews in Judea-Samaria to evacuate their homes to facilitate the establishment of said homophobic, misogynistic tyranny, which, almost certainly, will become a bastion for Islamist terror; yet they consider it morally reprehensible to offer financial inducements to Arabs in Judea-Samaria to evacuate their homes to prevent the establishment of such an entity?

 

FAQ 6: What about those who remain?

 

This is, of course, a serious question and a detailed response would depend on, among other things, the size of the residual Palestinian-Arab population who refuse any material compensation as an inducement to emigrate.

 

The acuteness of the problem would undoubtedly be a function of its scale. Clearly, the smaller this residual population, the less pressing the need will be to deal with it. For example it seems plausible that if, say, only a hundred thousand Palestinians remain, consideration may well be given to the possibility of offering them Israeli citizenship – subject to stringent security vetting and sworn acceptance of Jewish sovereignty as the sole legitimate source of authority in the land – without endangering the Jewish character of the country.

 

However, it should be remembered that, unlike the two-state approach which advocates perilous concessions, and the one-state prescription which calls for incorporating the Palestinian-Arabs resident across the pre-1967 lines into Israel’s permanent population, the HP does not involve any cataclysmic irreversible measures.

 

At the heart of the HP program is a comprehensive system of material inducements to foster Palestinian emigration, which includes generous incentives for leaving and harsh disincentives for staying. As detailed elsewhere, such incentives would entail substantial monetary grants, up to 100 years GDP per capita per family in Palestinian terms; while the latter entail phased withdrawal of services (including provision of water, electricity, fuel, port facilities and so on) that Israel currently provides to the Palestinian-Arabs across the pre-1967 lines.

 

Accordingly, should it be found that the initial proposed inducements are ineffective, the former can be made more enticing, and/or the latter more daunting, until the proffered package is acceptable.

 

Seen in this context, it is difficult to envisage that many non-belligerent Palestinian-Arabs would prefer to endure the rigors of discontinued provision of services rather than avail themselves of the generous relocation/rehabilitation funds—especially given the dispersal of the Palestinian regime as an alternative source of such services.

 

 FAQ 7 What if the same kind of offer were made to induce Jewish emigration?

 

In addressing this question several points should be borne in mind:

 

The offer would clearly not be made by an Israeli government. After all, the HP is intended as a measure to: (a) Ensure – not undermine – the survival of Israel as the nation-state of the Jews, and (b) Relieve the genuine humanitarian predicament of the Palestinian-Arabs—precipitated by the dysfunctional administration they have been subjected to since the 1993 Oslo process—not Jewish disgruntlement with the imperfect functioning of the Israeli government.

 

Of course, it would be impossible to prevent Arab elements from offering Jews financial inducement to emigrate from Israel, but in this regard it should be recalled that: (a) As a sovereign nation Israel can control the financial flows into the country and impede money from hostile sources reaching Israeli citizens, considerably complicating the transfer and receipt of funds. (b) Arab governments have been singularly reticent in providing large sums  to advance the “Palestinian cause” and there is little chance (or evidence) that they would advance the hundreds of billions required to finance large scale Jewish emigration;  (c) The overwhelming majority of Israelis enjoy living standards of an advanced post-industrial nation with a GDP per capita around 20 times higher than that in the Palestinian-administered territories; (d) Accordingly, it would be commensurately more difficult to tempt them to leave. Indeed, sums offered would have to be considerably higher to create a comparable incentive, running into millions rather than hundreds of thousands per family. (e) Moreover, a slew of recent polls show the large majority of Israelis are satisfied with their lives – thus the prospect of material incentives to induce large-scale emigration seems remote.

Urgent Zionist imperative.

 

The HP is the only Zionist-compliant policy prescription that can save Israel from the perilous dangers of the two-state formula and the specter of Lebanonization/Balkanization inherent in other proffered alternatives. Embarking on its implementation is a Zionist imperative that is both urgent and feasible.

_________________

Martin Sherman is the founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies.

Dr. Martin Sherman

The writer served for seven years in operational capacities in the Israeli Defense establishment, was ministerial adviser to Yitzhak Shamir’s government and lectured for 20 years at Tel Aviv University in Political Science, International Relations and Strategic Studies. He has a B.Sc. (Physics and Geology), MBA (Finance), and PhD in political science and international relations, was the first academic director of the Herzliya Conference and is the author of two books and numerous articles and policy papers on a wide range of political, diplomatic and security issues. He is founder and executive director of the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies (www.strategicisrael.org).

 

 Born in South Africa, he has lived in Israel since 1971. More from the author

 

© Arutz Sheva, All Rights Reserved

 

Israel Kicks Hostile Arab Armies’ Butts 50 Yrs. Ago


John R. Houk

© June 6, 2017

 

In the 1967 – 50-years ago – June 5 -10; Israel fought a war with at least four Arab nations amassing troops on Israel’s border. Begin counting from day one through the last day, you have the Six-Day War.

 

Israel AGAIN defeated armies much-much larger than the Israel Defense Force (IDF). The Arab nations prepared for invasion for what they believed would be the utter destruction of Israel. Wisely, Israel utterly surprised the Egyptian military front by launching a preemptive attack which destroyed most of Egypt’s air force. Using the shock to Israel’s advantage, the IDF then launched their vastly outnumbered tanks and pushed Egypt out of the Sinai.  Then Jordan and Syria launched their invasions unaware that Egypt had gotten their butts kicked in the Sinai. Although there was a less of a surprise, the IDF ultimately prevailed against Syria and Jordan. The Golan Heights was taken from Syria and the land conquered by Jordan in 1948 was taken back which included Israel’s heritage of uniting Jerusalem. Making Jerusalem whole allowed Jewish access to their most holy site left to them – the Western Wall still standing after the Romans destroyed the Jewish Temple circa 70 AD.

 

The Six Day War Project has a great video setting up the scene leading to 1967:

 

VIDEO: Why Did Israel Go To War? | Six Day War Project #1

 

Posted by Jerusalem U

Published on May 17, 2017

 

1/12 | In the first video of the mini-series, find out about the early steps that led to the 1967 Six Day War – a war that changed the future of Israel. Surrounded by enemy neighbors and only nine miles wide at its narrowest point, Israel was vulnerable.

See all the videos as they are released: http://www.sixdaywarproject.org/.

In May of 1967, the state of Israel was only 19 years old. At its inception in 1948, five Arab armies had coordinated a military invasion to prevent the creation of the small Jewish country. But Israel’s War of Independence succeeded in repelling the forces bent on Israel’s destruction. Israel reclaimed sovereignty over the ancient Jewish homeland, making way for the establishment of a Jewish country after 2,000 years of statelessness and periods of persecution.

Yet despite Israel’s success in creating a new country, it did not enjoy peace with its neighbors. Terrorism and frequent attacks on three borders kept Israel in a perpetual state of alert.

To the north, from the Golan Heights, Syria shelled Jewish communities below on a regular basis. In the South and East, Arab terrorists from Egyptian-controlled Gaza and the Jordanian-controlled West Bank infiltrated and perpetrated attacks on Israeli civilians, killing 400 in the 19 years since Israeli independence.

The attacks reached the point that they were condemned as “deplorable” by then-Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant.

Although the Jewish state had been welcomed into the United Nations and hailed by the international community, its Arab neighbors rejected its very right to exist, preparing to resume a war for Israel’s destruction which they had halted 19 years earlier. The Arab buildup for all-out war was very near.

In this video – the first in a 12-part mini-series – you will learn about the regional atmosphere leading up to the 1967 Six Day War, and find out about the early steps that led to the war that changed the future of Israel.

Like the Six Day War Project on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/sixdaywarproject

This video was produced by Jerusalem U in partnership with The Jerusalem Post, the Jewish Federations of North America, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, the Jewish National Fund, the Israel Action Network, the European Jewish Congress and the Center for Israel Education. For more on the dramatic events and impact of the Six Day War, visit sixdaywarproject.org.

Thumbnail Photo Credit: Israel GPO/Moshe Milner
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Are you Jewish and aged 16-28? You could be eligible for READ THE REST

 

If you are a bit impatient to educate yourself at the Six Day War Project, here is a 6:45 abbreviated 6-Day War documentary that will provide the highlights:

 

VIDEO: 50 Years Later: Remembering the Six-Day War

 

Posted by AIPAC

Published on May 24, 2017

 

While the military victory was resounding, the Six-Day War created unresolved challenges that Israel grapples with to this day. The war also bolstered America’s pro-Israel community and helped to further reinforce the foundation of the U.S.-Israel strategic relationship and America’s pro-Israel community. Learn more: http://fal.cn/SixDayWarReflections

 

Adam Garfinkle wrote an essay for the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) reflecting on his historical view of the results of the Israeli victory in the 6-Day War.

 

JRH 6/6/17

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The Six Day and Fifty Years War

 

By Adam Garfinkle

June 5, 2017

Foreign Policy Research Institute

 

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Chief-of-Staff Yitzhak Rabin, Gen. Rehavam Zeevi R and Gen. Narkis in the old city of Jerusalem – Source: Government Press Office/Flickr

 

The most important lesson of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war is that there is no such thing as a clean war. That war was very short and stunningly decisive militarily; it has been anything but politically. From the Israeli point of view, military victory solved some serious near-term challenges, but at the cost of generating or exacerbating a host of longer-term ones—some of which may have come along anyway, some not, some of which may have been averted (or worsened) had Israeli postwar policy been different—and we cannot know for certain which are which. To ask whether what has transpired after the war “had to be that way” constitutes an aspiration to levitate the philosopher’s stone.

 

At any rate, of the war’s many consequences, three stand out as pre-eminent. First, major wars change the societies that fight and endure their consequences. The Six Day War changed the political, social-psychological, and, in at least one key case, demographic balances within all the participating states and a few others besides, with multiple and varying secondary and tertiary effects over the years. Second, despite the war’s after-optic of a smashing Arab loss, it was the best thing that ever happened to the Palestinian national movement. And third, the war catalyzed a redirection of U.S. Cold War policy in the Middle East (and arguably beyond) from one teetering on the edge of generic failure to one of significant success.

 

At this fiftieth “jubilee” anniversary of the war, buckets of ink will inevitably be spilled mooting and booting about such questions and many others; a lot already has been, and I am not reluctant to add to the bucket count.[1] But before doing so, we all need to take a deep breath to inhale as much humility as we can—to remind ourselves what exactly we are doing and what we cannot do when we exhume moldering chunks of anniversarial history for reexamination.

 

Shiny Anniversaries

 

We are so very attracted to anniversaries in the long parade of political history. We love to draw clear lessons from them, if we can—and if we can’t some others will claim to do so anyway. We are also attracted to thinking in terms of parsimonious eras with sharp lines of delineation between them; anniversaries of turning or tipping points help us mightily to draw such lines—which is precisely why we call them epochal. Wars, mostly hot but occasionally cold, figure centrally in the pantheon of such points.

 

The June 1967 Arab-Israeli War is all but universally considered to be epochal in this sense, so the recent ink flow is no wonder as journalists, scholars, memoirists, and others look for lessons and insight as to how those supposed sharp lines that divide eras were drawn. The subtitle of a new book furnishes a case in point: “The Breaking of the Middle East.”[2]

 

There is a problem here—at least one, arguably more than one. Without yet having read this book, I cannot say for sure that this subtitle is not magnificently meaningful. But I can say for sure that it puzzles me. What does it mean to say that a region of the world is “broken”? Does it imply that before the 1967 Middle East War the region was somehow whole, a description that implies adjectives such as peaceful, stable, and nestled in the warm logic of a benign cosmos; and suggests that regional wholeness also meant that its state or regime units were seen as legitimate by their own populations and by other states and regimes? So on June 4, 1967, the Middle East was whole, and by June 11, it was well on its way to being broken?

 

All of which is to say that the penchant for reposing great significance in anniversaries is often distortive, because for many it reinforces the right-angled sureties and sharp distinctions—and presumed causal chains leading into our own time bearing those precious, sought-after lessons—that historical reality rarely abides. Only by rounding off the ragged edges, usually with a rasp composed of our contemporary concerns and convictions unselfconsciously pointed backwards, can such artificial categories be devised. Ambiguity annoys most people, and so they go to some lengths to duck it, in the case of getting arms around history by generating categories, boxes, and labels into which to shove obdurate facts. History, meanwhile, remains the sprawling entropic mess it has always been and will always remain.

 

To employ the anti-ambiguity rasp presupposes, too, that the craftsman commands cause and effect. We can, after all, only simplify a reality we presume to understand in its detail. When it comes to the Six Day War, that means presuming to know how it started and why, how it ended and why, and what the war led to thereafter in an array of categories: how the postwar geopolitical trajectory of the core Middle Eastern region and its periphery spilled forth; how the region’s relationship to the key Cold War superpower protagonists shifted; the war’s impact on the domestic political cultures of participants and near-onlookers; and more besides.

 

The problem here is that we know with confidence only some of these causal skeins, and, what is more (or actually less), some of what we know has not stayed constant over the past half century. At one point, say thirty years ago, we thought we understood the Soviet government’s role in fomenting the crisis by sending false reports of events in Syria to the Egyptian leadership; after the Soviet archive opened in the early 1990s, consensus on that point has weakened as revisionist interpretations have come forth.[3] Nasser’s moving-target motives at various points in the crisis leading to war seemed clear for a time, until they no longer quite did. Several more examples of elusive once-truths could be cited.

 

Alas, every seminal event has a pre-context and a post-context: the convolutions of historical reality that give rise to an event and its causal afterflow. The further we get from the event, the greater the still-expanding post-context overshadows the pre-context, because we can see, for example, how various things turned out in 2017 in a way we could not have in, say, 1987. But so much else has happened that must, of necessity, dilute any construction of direct or preponderant causality.

 

Thus, did the war push Israeli society into becoming more religious, as many have claimed? Did it help shift Israeli politics to the Right by transforming the relationship of Orthodox Judaism to Zionism, leading Orthodox Israelis to engage on many political issues to which they had been formerly aloof? Or was that a deeper social-demographic trend that would have happened anyway, if differently, war or no war? So we face a paradox: the richer the post-context becomes for any epochal event, the poorer becomes our ability to isolate its downstream impact. As already suggested, we often enough make up for that poverty by exiling natural ambiguity before the demands of our current questions or biases. That is how we predict the past.

 

Scholars do try to isolate causal threads, of course, but differently because intellectual business models, so to speak, differ. Historians tend to seek out particularities; political scientists tend to search for general rules. Historians like their rocks fresh and jagged; political scientists like theirs rounded by patterns that flow through time. Each to their own intellectual aesthetic.

 

And the rest of us? How do we chase truth in history? Consider that if you pick up a history book and a memoir old enough to serve as an adjunct to it, you will have in your hands two different perspectives on the political world. An international political history of the 1930s written in the 2010s will take a passage of reality—say about the British, French, and American reaction to the 1935 Italian aggression against Ethiopia—and might spend two sentences or perhaps a paragraph on it. A memoir written in the 1950s by someone actually involved in debating and shaping that reaction will read very differently, recalling details, sideways connections to other issues, and nuances of policies and personalities bound to be lost in a general text if it aspires to be less than 10,000 pages long. In a history book such a mid-level event is likely to be framed as a consequence of larger forces that were leading to more portentous happenings (say, World War II); in a memoir it is more likely to be framed as both illustration of a synthetic historical moment, akin to a zeitgeist that is fully felt but is recalcitrant to reductionist analysis, and partial cause of what came after. Which do we read; which do we trust?

 

The answer is both, and wholly neither. How will the Six Day War figure in history books fifty years from now? There’s no way to know, because it will depend at least as much on what happens between now and then as it will on what happened in May and June 1967. But one thing we do know: As the post-context of the war doubles, the thinness and sameness of the description will grow, and be of little help in understanding how the main actors involved saw their circumstances. It will lose a sense of human verisimilitude. Details invariably give way to theme, and narratives grow shorter even as their truth claims grow larger. The thickness of memoirs will retain that sense of human verisimilitude. But what they provide in terms of broader context may suffer from too narrow an authorial aperture, and perhaps a bad memory in service to ego protection, if not other incidental causes of inaccuracy. As with many aspects of life, intellectual and otherwise, tradeoffs spite us in our search for clarity.

 

The point of all this?  Anniversaries are shiny. They attract a lot of attention, much of it self-interested and sentimental enough to lure some people into excessive simplifications if not outright simplemindedness. If someone will bait the hook, someone else will swallow it. We witnessed exactly such a spectacle not long ago at the 100th anniversary of Sykes-Picot, and we’ll see it again a few months hence with the 100th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.[4] But as Max Frankel once said, “simplemindedness is not a handicap in the competition of social ideas”—or, he might have added, historical interpretations. If it gets you on TV talk shows to sell your book, no form of simplification is liable to remain out of bounds these days. After all, what is fake history if not a collection of aged fake news?

 

Shining On

 

Never mind all that: I want people to read this essay, so rest assured that I know what happened and why, and what it all means even down to today. And now that I have donned sequins and glitter, I can be almost as brief and punchy as I am shiny, as is the current custom.

 

What did the war mean for the region? Plenty. It proved to remaining doubters that the Arabs could not destroy Israel by conventional force of arms. It helped establish Israel’s permanence in the eyes of its adversaries, the world at large, and, to an extent, in the eyes of its own people. That changed Israel’s domestic political culture. It no longer felt to the same extent like a pressure-cooking society under constant siege, and that, along with demographic and other subterranean social trends, ironically loosened the political grip of Israel’s founding generation of leaders, and the Labor Party. Less than a decade after the war Revisionist Zionists came to power for the first time, and now, fifty years later, Israel has the most rightwing government in its history. Did the Six Day War directly cause that? Of course not; but it was one of many factors that steered Israeli politics toward its current circumstances.

 

The war also began the occupation, first of Golan, the West Bank, and Gaza—in time a bit less of Golan and not of Gaza at all. If you had told typical Israelis in the summer of 1967 that fifty years later the West Bank would still be essentially occupied, neither traded for peace nor annexed, they would have thought you mad or joking. Israel as an independent state was 19 years and a few weeks old on June 5, 1967. The twentieth anniversary of the war in 1987 was about the midpoint of Israel’s modern history, half within-the-Green-Line and half beyond it. Now vastly more of Israel’s history has passed with the occupation as a part of it. Many more Israelis today cannot remember Israel in its pre-June 1967 borders than can—and that includes the Arabs citizens of the state as well as their ethno-linguistic kin living in the West Bank and Gaza.

 

In Israel there is a huge open debate, and a constant more private discussion beneath it, as to how the occupation has changed the nature of Israeli society. It is a difficult debate to set premises for, because in fifty years a lot is going to change in any modern society, occupation or no occupation. My view, like that of most Israelis I know, is that the occupation has been significantly corrosive of many Israeli institutions. They would like the occupation to end if it could be ended safely; but increasingly most agree that it can’t be, at least anytime soon. The remarkable fact is that, considering the circumstances, the damage to morale and heart, beyond institutions, has not been even worse. Israel’s moral realism has proved resilient. But the damage has not been slight, and of course it is ongoing.

 

As for the Arabs, the war crushed the pretentions of Arab Socialism and of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Within what the late Malcolm Kerr called “the Arab Cold War” it played in favor of the Arab monarchies against the military-ruled republics and hence generally in favor of the West; but it did not guarantee the safety of monarchical rule everywhere: Just 27 months later the Sanusi kingdom in Libya fell to a young army colonel named Muamar Qadaffi. None of the defeated Arab states lost its leader right away: not Nasser in Egypt, or King Hussein in Jordan, or Nurredin al-Atassi in Syria. But by the late autumn of 1970 Nasser was dead and al-Atassi had been displaced by Hafez al-Assad. Rulers also rolled in Iraq, and the very next year, with the British withdrawal from East of Suez, the United Arab Emirates came into being against its own will.

 

The war, therefore, was one element—more important in some places than others—in a general roiling of Arab politics (and I haven’t even mentioned stability-challenged zones like Yemen and Sudan), those politics being pre-embedded, so to speak, in generically weak states (again, some more than others).[5] Not that Arab politics was an oasis of serenity before June 1967 either, as a glance at post-independence Syrian history will show. Indeed, the contention that the Six Day War, by hollowing out the pretensions of secular Arab nationalism for all to see, presaged the “return of Islam” with which we and many others struggle today is both true and overstated—in other words, too shiny. The frailties of secular nationalism among the Arab states preceded the war and would have multiplied on account of any number and kind of failures to come, war or no war.

 

In any event, the political impact of the Arab loss was mitigated by the “Palestine” contradiction that then lay at the heart of Arab politics. “Palestine” was, and remains to some extent, a badge of shame, for it epitomizes the failure of the Arab states to achieve its goals. Yet it is only a badge; the persistence of the conflict, sharply inflected by the 1967 loss, has served as a raison d’être for most ruling Arab elites, their unflagging opposition to Israel as a symbol of legitimacy. In the parlous context of inter-Arab politics, too, the conflict has served as the only thing on which all the Arab regimes could symbolically unite. Non-democratic Arab elites have used the conflict both as a form of street control internally, and as a jousting lance in their relations with other Arab states.

 

Yet by far the most important consequence of the Arab defeat in 1967 was to free the Palestinian national movement from the clutches of the Arab states. The theory before June 1967 was that the Arab states would destroy Israel in a convulsive, epic war, and then hand Palestine over to the Palestinians. The hysteria that overtook the Arab street leading to war shows how widespread this theory was, and the war itself showed how hollow a promise it was. So the Palestinians took matters into their own hands for the first time, seizing control of the Palestine Liberation Organization from its Egyptian sponsors and reversing the theoretical dynamic of liberation:  Palestinians would liberate Palestine, and that victory would supercharge and unify the Arabs to face the hydra-headed monster of Western imperialism. The key bookends of this transformation as it manifested itself in Arab politics writ large were the Rabat Arab Summit of 1974, which passed responsibility for “occupied Palestine” from Jordan to the PLO, and the 1988 decision by King Hussein to formally relinquish Jordan’s association with the West Bank, which it had annexed and ruled for 18 years after the 1949 Rhodes Armistice agreements.

 

But how would the Palestinians themselves, led by the new and authentic PLO, liberate Palestine? They had in mind a revolutionary people’s war, an insurrection focused on the territories Israel newly occupied. It took its inspiration from lukewarm Maoism and its example from the Vietcong. The attempted insurrection in the West Bank failed miserably and rapidly; terrorist attacks mounted from east of the Jordan and across the border with Egypt became the next tactical phase as Palestinian nationalism’s organizational expression fractured. In time, Palestinian use of contiguous lands in Jordan and later in Lebanon to launch repeated terror attacks against Israeli civilians sparked civil wars in both countries. It did not bring about the “liberation” of even one square centimeter of “Palestine.”

 

Terrorism, however, did put the Palestinian issue “on the map” for much of the world, and now, fifty years later, Palestinians can have a state if their leaders really want one and are prepared to do what it takes to get it—the evidence so far suggesting that they don’t, and won’t. Nevertheless, looking back from fifty years’ hindsight, the Six Day War was about the best thing that could have happened for the Palestinians; that fact that they have not consolidated that windfall politically is their own doing, but everyone’s tragedy.

 

As to terrorism, it is true that the pusillanimous behavior of many governments in the 1970s, including some allied in NATO to the United States, helped the PLO shoot, bomb, and murder its way to political respectability. So one might venture that by helping to show that terrorism post-Six Day War can work at least to some extent, these governments bear some responsibility for the metathesis of nationalist, instrumentalist terrorism into the mass-murder apocalyptical kind we have witnessed more recently with al-Qaeda and ISIS. To me it’s another in a series of shiny arguments, more superficially attractive than fully persuasive. It is not entirely baseless, however.

 

But far more important than what the war did for the thinking of the Palestinians was what it did to the thinking of the Arab state leaders whose lands were now under Israeli occupation: Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.  Before the war, Arab support for “Palestine” was highly theoretical, highly ineffectual, and in truth amounted merely to a symbolic football the Arab regimes used to compete with one another in the ethereal arena of pan-Arab fantasies. Now, suddenly, the core national interests of three Arab states—including the largest and most important one, Egypt—became directly and ineluctably entwined with the reality as opposed to the symbol of Israel.

 

The Egyptians, particularly after Nasser’s death brought Anwar el-Sadat to power, got downright pragmatic. Israel had something these three states wanted—chunks of their land. And the Egyptian and Jordanian leaderships, at least, knew that a price would have to be paid to redeem that pragmatism. Complications aplenty there were, as anyone who lived through the dozen years after the 1967 War knows well. Nevertheless, this critical divide among the Arabs—between state leaders who could afford to remain only symbolically engaged and those who could not—shaped inter-Arab politics then and still does to some degree today. First Egypt in March 1979 and then Jordan in October 1994 paid the price and made peace with Israel. It seemed like forever passed between June 1967 and March 1979, but it was less than a dozen years—quick by historical standards.

 

While Egypt recovered the entire Sinai through its peace arrangement with Israel, Jordan did not recover the West Bank. The war had shifted the political demography of the Hashemite Kingdom, sending more Palestinians to live among East Bankers—some now refugees twice over and some for the first time. The consequence was to intensify Jordan’s internalization of its problem with Palestinian nationalism: It had lost land but gained souls whose fealty to the monarchy was presumably weak. The benefit of peace to Jordan in 1984, and hence its main purpose from King Hussein’s point of view, was therefore not to regain territory but to strengthen the stake that both Israel and the United States had in Jordan’s stability in the face of future challenge from any quarter, internal and external alike.

 

Syria, do note, did not follow the Egyptian and Jordanian path to peace, and so the Golan Heights remain for all practical purposes part of Israel. The reasons have to do with the complex sectarian demography of the country, and specifically with the fact that since 1970 Syria has been ruled by a minoritarian sect in loose confederation with the country’s other non-Sunni minorities. The Alawi regime has needed the symbolic pan-Arab mantle of the Palestinian cause more than any other Arab state, particularly as one with a border with Israel. Regime leaders anyway did not consider the Golan to be their sectarian patrimony, but more important, peace and normalization seemed to the Syrian leadership more of a threat to its longevity (and to its ability to meddle in Lebanese affairs) than a benefit. Now that Syria as a territorial unit has dissolved in a brutal civil war, the legacy of 1967 has been rendered all but moot.

 

Does that mean that Egypt and Jordan essentially sold out the Palestinians, making a separate peace? Well, much political theater aside, yes. But they really had no choice, and not selling out the Palestinians would not have gained the Palestinians what they wanted anyway. That, in turn, left the Palestinians with little choice. Eventually, the PLO leadership also decided to “engage” Israel directly, but without giving up what it still called the “armed struggle.”

 

Its partial pragmatism, tactical in character, gained the PLO a partial advance for the Palestinians through the truncated Oslo process: a kind of government with a presence in Palestine; some “police” under arms; a transitional capital in Ramallah; wide international recognition; and more. Withal, the “territories” remain under Israeli security control, and the Palestinian economy (jobs, electricity grid, water, and more) remains essentially a hostage to Israel’s.

 

This has given rise to perhaps the most underappreciated irony in a conflict replete with them: First Israel internalized the Palestinian nationalist problem in June 1967 by occupying at length the West Bank and Gaza, and then the PLO internalized its Israel problem by drifting via Oslo into essential dependence on Israel for basic sustenance and even security support (against Hamas, for example). Note that it was hard for Israel to bomb PLO headquarters in Tunis in October 1985, but very easy to send a tank column into downtown Ramallah ten years later. It’s all so very odd, you may think, but there you have it.

 

The Bigger Picture

 

Now to the larger, international scene. What the Six Day War showed was that Soviet patronage of the Arabs and arms sales to them could deliver neither victory to the Arabs nor reflected advantage for the Soviet Union. This devalued the allure of Soviet regional overtures reassured the Western-oriented Arab regimes and hence played directly into the portfolio of U.S. and Western interests: keep the Soviets out, the oil flowing, and Israel in existence (the latter construed at the time as a moral-historical obligation, not a strategic desideratum).

 

The Johnson administration figured the essence out, which is why in the aftermath of the war it did not do what the Eisenhower administration did after the Suez War of 1956: pressure Israel to leave the territories it had conquered in return for promises that, in the event, turned out to be worthless. It rather brokered a new document—UNSCR 242—calling for withdrawal from territories (not “the” territories) in return for peace.

 

But it was not until the War of Attrition broke out in 1969 around and above the Suez Canal—a direct follow-on to the Six Day War—that the new Nixon administration codified in policy this basic strategic understanding. To prevent and if possible roll back Soviet inroads in the Middle East, the U.S. government would guarantee continued Israeli military superiority—that was the start of the major U.S. military supply relationship to Israel that endures today (the younger set may not know it, but Israel won the Six Day War with a French-supplied air force). In short, nothing the Soviets could supply or do would help the Arabs regain their lands or make good their threats. The events of the Jordanian Civil War in September 1970, and the way Nixon administration principles insisted on interpreting and speaking about that civil war, only deepened the conviction and the anchors of the policy.

 

On balance, the policy worked well, despite one painful interruption. By July 1972, President Sadat had sent a huge Soviet military mission packing out of Egypt, and was all but begging the United States to open a new relationship. Egypt had been by far the most critical of Soviet clients in the Middle East, and Sadat’s volte face represented a huge victory for U.S. diplomacy. Alas, neither the victory-besotted Israelis nor the increasingly distracted Americans paid Sadat the attention he craved—so he taunted the Soviets to give him just enough stuff to draw Jerusalem and Washington’s eyes his way: He started a war in October 1973. This also worked, leading as already noted to the March 1979 peace treaty—a geopolitical and psychological game-changer in the region and, ultimately, beyond.

 

For most practical purposes, Israel’s role as an effective proxy for U.S. power in the Middle East endured through the end of the Cold War, although its benefits paid out quietly, more often than not in what trouble it deterred as opposed to actively fought.[6] And the Israeli-Egyptian relationship—imperfect as it may be—still endures as a guarantee that there can be no more Arab-Israeli conventional wars on the scale of 1967 or even 1973. These are both, at least partially, strategic achievements born of the conjoining of Israeli power and American diplomacy, and—it bears mentioning—these are achievements that were constructed and made to endure pretty much regardless of the state of play in Israel’s relations with the Palestinians.

 

Obviously, the end of the Cold War put paid to the structure of this regional American strategy, its logic dissipated through victory. In that sense, the larger global strategic impact of the Six Day War ended when the Berlin Wall fell. While Israel remains a strategic partner of the United States in the post-Cold War environment, largely through intelligence sharing and other activities, its value as strategic proxy diminished as the focus of U.S. concerns moved east, toward Iraq and the Gulf. In the 1991 Gulf War, for example, Israel through no fault of its own became a complication for American policy—a target set for Iraqi scuds—not an asset, such that the U.S. government pleaded with its Israel counterpart not to use its military power against a common foe.

 

Amid the sectarian and proxy wars of the present moment in the region, Israeli arms lack any point of political entrée that can aid U.S. policy. Even when it comes to counterterrorism efforts, Israeli intelligence is indeed valuable but we will not see Israeli special forces attacking salafi terrorist organizations far from home. The last thing Israel needs is to persuade still more murderous enemies to gaze its way.

 

Only if the two parties come to focus on a common enemy—never the case during the Cold War, by the way, when for Israel the Arabs were the threat and for the United States the Soviets were the threat—could a truly robust U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership be born anew. And that common enemy, which could bring in also many Sunni Arab states and possibly Turkey as well, is of course Iran. But we are now very deep into the post-context of the Six Day War, more than six degrees of separation from any plausible causal skein leading back to June 1967.

 

A Smaller Picture

 

The war affected the political and social-psychological condition not only of state actors but of some others as well. As the Middle East crisis deepened in May 1967, I was a (nearly) 16-year old Jewish high school student in the Washington, D.C. area. Just like every American who was of age in November 1963 can remember where they were and what they were doing when they heard that President Kennedy had been assassinated, I suspect that just about every Jew of age anywhere in the world in May and June of 1967 can remember where they were and what they were doing when they heard that the war had started, and how they felt when it had ended.

 

We had been frightened, and afterwards we were relieved and even elated. It turned out that a lot of what we thought was true about the state of affairs at the time was incorrect. That was hardly a unique experience, but more important, over time the effects of the Six Day War on American Jewry and other Jewish communities outside Israel were dramatic—and the triangular relationship between Israel, American Jewry, and the United States has never since been the same.[7]

 

Figuring it all out has borne its own challenges, surprises, and disappointments. Those on all three sides who thought they knew what was going on—who was dependent on whom, who could count on whom, who had political leverage over whom, and so on—learned better, often the hard way. But none of this has involved armies with modern weapons and high-level state diplomacies interacting; no, it is truly complicated and tends to generate narratives that are very, very shiny—so let’s just leave it at that.

 

If You Pick Up the Gun, You Roll the Dice 

 

Let us conclude by returning to where we began, using another’s much earlier conclusion as our prooftext. On Saturday, June 3, 1967, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol concluded a meeting of his inner cabinet with these words: “Nothing will be settled by a military victory. The Arabs will still be here.”

 

Eshkol (as well as the out-of-office but still prominent David Ben-Gurion) had counseled patience and restraint to Israel’s confident military leadership as the spring 1967 crisis grew, and only reluctantly came to the decision for war. Keenly sensing the ironies of history—Jewish history not least—he knew that the war would not be politically conclusive. He realized that whatever immediate threats needed to be extinguished, war would not deliver peace and security before, if ever, it delivered mixed and unanticipated consequences. He was right.

 

Not even the shrewdest statesmen are wise enough to foresee the consequences of a major war: When you pick up the gun, you roll the dice. That, I think, is no shiny lesson, but one more likely for the historically literate to recall the past’s many dull pains. May it help future leaders to control their own and others’ expectations if use force they must.

_____________

[1] I have written on the anniversary of the Six Day War before:  See “Arab Loss Had Profound Effect on Politics in the Middle East,” Jewish Exponent, June 5, 1987; “1967: One War Won, a Few Others Started,” Newsday, April 30, 1998; and “Six Days, and Forty Years,” The American Spectator, June 5, 2007.

 

[2] Guy Laron, The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East (Yale University Press).

[3] See, for example, Isabella Ginor & Gideon Remez, Foxbats Over Dimona: The Soviets’ Nuclear Gamble in the Six-Day War (Yale University Press, 2007).

[4]  On the former, note my “The Bullshistory of “Sykes-Picot”, The American Interest Online, May 16, 2016.

[5] For detail on what is meant by “pre-embedded” in “generically weak states,” see my “The Fall of Empires and the Formation of the Modern Middle East,” Orbis (Spring 2016).

[6] A point emphasized in Michael Mandelbaum, “1967’s Gift to America,” The American Interest Online, June 2, 2017.

[7] I have written of this triangular relationship elsewhere: “The Triangle Connecting the U.S., Israel and American Jewry May Be Coming Apart,” Tablet, November 5, 2013.

________________

Israel Kicks Hostile Arab Armies’ Butts 50 Yrs. Ago

John R. Houk

© June 6, 2017

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The Six Day and Fifty Years War

 

The Foreign Policy Research Institute, founded in 1955, is a non-partisan, non-profit 501(c)(3) organization devoted to bringing the insights of scholarship to bear on the development of policies that advance U.S. national interests. In the tradition of our founder, Ambassador Robert Strausz-Hupé, Philadelphia-based FPRI embraces history and geography to illuminate foreign policy challenges facing the United States. More about FPRI »

 

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President Trump Fails Jerusalem


John R. Houk

June 2, 2017

 

Well, it appears President Trump has caved to the advice of the Swamp and (probably) the GOP Establishment to not move the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Israel’s Capital City of Jerusalem.

 

The official reason is to pursue an impossible peace between Arabs that call themselves Palestinians and the Jewish State of Israel.

 

President Trump is no dummy when it comes to deal making with Palestinians those Islamic terrorists will never accept the existence of a Jewish State, will always demand the unreasonable delusion of the return of the descendants of Muslims who fled the original Arab invasion in 1948.

 

ALSO, from a Biblical perspective, a Palestinian Muslim State on Jewish heritage will be a thorn in the side of Israel that I have no doubt will result in an IDF invasion of their own Judea-Samaria land proposed as a sovereign nation. Why an IDF invasion? The constant Islamic terrorism against Jews that will continue under a Palestinian State who in turn reward the families of Islamic terrorist perpetrators.

 

Considering this impossible peace, I sense a closer reason for the President Trump cave-in had to do with Swamp Elitists, GOP Establishment and foreign leader pressure against moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem.

 

JRH 6/2/17

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Trump Won’t Move US Embassy to Jerusalem, but He Did Make This Promise

 

By Benjamin Gill & Tzippe Barrow

June 1, 2017

CBNNews.com

 

JERUSALEM, Israel – President Donald Trump decided today he will not be moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

 

During his campaign, Trump promised to move the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, thrilling Israelis and many pro-Israel Christian voters. But the White House says he can’t do it just yet.

 

“No one should consider this step to be in any way a retreat from the President’s strong support for Israel and for the United States-Israel alliance,” the White House said in a statement.

 

The statement makes clear the president made the decision because he intends to push ahead with plans for peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

 

“President Trump made this decision to maximize the chances of successfully negotiating a deal between Israel and the Palestinians, fulfilling his solemn obligation to defend America’s national security interests,” the statement said.

 

“But, as he has repeatedly stated his intention to move the embassy, the question is not if that move happens, but only when,” it continued.

 

The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a statement expressing disappointment with the decision.

 

“Israel’s consistent position is that the American embassy, like the embassies of all countries with whom we have diplomatic relations, should be in Jerusalem, our eternal capital.  Maintaining embassies outside the capital drives peace further away by helping keep alive the Palestinian fantasy that the Jewish people and the Jewish state have no connection to Jerusalem,” the statement said.
“Though Israel is disappointed that the embassy will not move at this time, we appreciate today’s expression of President Trump’s friendship to Israel and his commitment to moving the embassy in the future.”

 

Many were hoping the president would announce his decision to move the embassy during his recent visit. Now he has kicked the can down the road like his predecessors, former presidents Barack Obama, George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George H.W. Bush, postponing the decision for another six months.

 

For more than two decades, the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act, stipulating that the embassy be relocated to Jerusalem, has been pushed off.

 

The waiver is almost always justified on the basis of further complicating the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which actively warns against such a move.

 

While Trump reportedly would like to fulfill his campaign promise, he appears to have opted for postponement to avoid condemnation by Arab nations and other Western allies.

 

At a Jerusalem Day event last week, Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat said to President Trump, “…we are grateful and say again that we want to see the transfer of the embassy to Jerusalem.”

 

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President Trump Fails Jerusalem

John R. Houk

June 2, 2017

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Trump Won’t Move US Embassy to Jerusalem, but He Did Make This Promise

 

© 2017 The Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc., A nonprofit 501 (c)(3) Charitable Organization. CBN News

 

Jerusalem Gold


Intro to ‘Jerusalem Gold’ Press Release

John R. Houk, Editor

Sent from Ari Bussel

Posted on May 24, 2017

 

Fifty-years ago from June 5, 1967; three Arab armies mobilized on the Israeli border itching for yet another shot to destroy the Jewish State. This is significant because the Six-Day War of 1967 returned the whole of Jerusalem to its Jewish heritage. On June 7, the IDF entered Eastern Jerusalem.

 

Ari Bussel sent me a press release that the Jewish community in the Los Angeles area will have a Jerusalem Remembrance Day commemorating the return of the City of David back to Israeli sovereignty.

 

VIDEO: Jerusalem – 1967 – The Six-Day War English

 

Here are some relevant excerpts on the 1967 Arab mobilization and Israel’s response at the Jewish Virtual Library:

 

 

… Israel repeatedly protested the Syrian bombardments to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission, which was charged with policing the cease-fire, but the UN did nothing to stop Syria’s aggression — even a mild Security Council resolution expressing “regret” for such incidents was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Israel was condemned by the United Nations when it retaliated.

 

While the Syrian military bombardment and terrorist attacks intensified, Nasser’s rhetoric became increasingly bellicose. In 1965, he announced, “We shall not enter Palestine with its soil covered in sand; we shall enter it with its soil saturated in blood.”(4)

 

 

Syria’s attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights finally provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967. During the attack, Israeli planes shot down six Syrian fighter planes — MiGs supplied by the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets — who had been providing military and economic assistance to both Syria and Egypt — gave Damascus false information alleging a massive Israeli military buildup in preparation for an attack. Despite Israeli denials, Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt and asked Nasser to come to its aid.

 

Countdown to War

 

On May 15, Israel’s Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border. By May 18, Syrian troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights.

 

Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), stationed in the Sinai since 1956 as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces after Israel’s withdrawal following the Sinai Campaign, to withdraw on May 16. Without bringing the matter to the attention of the General Assembly (as his predecessor had promised), Secretary-General U Thant complied with the demand. …

 

 

The Blockade

 

On May 22, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel’s only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran.

 

 

King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30. Nasser then announced:

 

The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel…to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations.(13)

 

 

The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces. Approximately 465,000 troops, more than 2,800 tanks, and 800 aircraft ringed Israel.(15)

 

 

Israel decided to preempt the expected Arab attack. To do this successfully, Israel needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic disadvantage. On June 5, Prime Minister Eshkol gave the order to attack Egypt.

 

 

On June 5, 1967, Israel was isolated, but its military commanders had conceived a brilliant war strategy. The entire Israeli Air Force, with the exception of just 12 fighters assigned to defend Israeli air space, took off at 7:14 a.m. in  Operation Moked (aka Operation Focus) with the intent of bombing Egyptian airfields while the Egyptian pilots were eating breakfast. By 11:05 a.m. 180 Egyptian fighter planes were destroyed. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was not planning to attack Syria until the Syrians attacked Tiberias and Megiddo. Israeli fighters subsequently attacked the Syrian and Jordanian air forces, as well as one airfield in Iraq. By the end of the first day, most of the Egyptian and half the Syrian air forces had been destroyed on the ground.

 

… On June 9, at 5:45 a.m., the head of Southern Command informed the chief of staff: “IDF forces are on the banks of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. …

 

 

Jerusalem Is Attacked

 

Initially, Israel did not plan to capture the West Bank. …

 

Prime Minister Levi Eshkol sent a message to King Hussein on June 5 saying Israel would not attack Jordan unless he initiated hostilities. When Jordanian radar picked up a cluster of planes flying from Egypt to Israel, and the Egyptians convinced Hussein the planes were theirs, he ordered the shelling of West Jerusalem. It turned out that the planes were Israel’s and were returning from destroying the Egyptian air force on the ground.

 

Hussein’s decision changed the course of the war. Israel counterattacked. …

 

At 6:15 a.m. on June 7, Dayan ordered the encirclement of the Old City and instructed the army to enter. Israeli paratroopers stormed the city and secured it. At 10:08 a.m., according to the army diary, a message was received, saying, “The Temple Mount is in our hands and our forces are by the [Western] Wall.” … [Bold Text Editor’s]

 

 

After just six days of fighting, Israeli forces were in a position to march on Cairo, Damascus, and Amman. By this time, the principal objectives of capturing the Sinai and the Golan Heights had been accomplished, and Israeli political leaders had no desire to fight in the Arab capitals. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had become increasingly alarmed by the Israeli advances and was threatening to intervene. At this point, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised the Israelis “in the strongest possible terms” to accept a cease-fire. On June 10, Israel did just that.

 

READ ENTIRETY (The Six-Day War: Background & Overview; Sourced from Mitchell G. Bard; Jewish Virtual Library; source © 2008)

 

I don’t know if you realize it, but Israel acquiring portions of their heritage in 1967 is not only of historical significance, it is also of Biblical significance. I can’t pinpoint the Judaic significance due to a bit of ignorance on my part. However, the Christian prophetic perspective points to another sign the Last Days are around the corner and the soon return of Jesus the Christ to restore the full Redemption not only of humanity but also a restoration of the whole earth.

 

1 Now I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first earth had passed away. Also there was no more sea. Then I, John,[a] saw the holy city, New Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a loud voice from heaven saying, “Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell with them, and they shall be His people. God Himself will be with them and be their God. And God will wipe away every tear from their eyes; there shall be no more death, nor sorrow, nor crying. There shall be no more pain, for the former things have passed away.”

 

Then He who sat on the throne said, “Behold, I make all things new.” And He said to me,[b] “Write, for these words are true and faithful.” (Revelation 21: 1-5 NKJV)

 

Below is the slightly edited press release sent by Ari Bussel which includes a few photos sent as well.

 

JRH 5/24/17

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Jerusalem of Gold

The official Los Angeles celebration of the 50th Anniversary of the Reunification of Jerusalem

 

Press Release Sent by Ari Bussel

Sent 5/22/2017 12:13 AM

 

June 7th, 2017, 7:30PM

Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Museum of Tolerance, Los Angeles

 

In 2017, and for the past 50 years, there is only one place in the entire Middle East and the African continent where freedom of religion is paramount, and people as well as holy sites flourish, as they are protected by law and by practice.

 

This place is Jerusalem, Israel’s capital from Biblical to present times. For two thousand years, the Jewish people yearned to return to their homeland and to the holy city of Jerusalem.

 

Here, Abraham prepared to sacrifice his son Isaac as a test of his loyalty to God the Almighty; Jacob dreamed of the ladder with angels ascending and descending; King David conquered the city and made it his capital, bringing the Ark of the Covenant here; His son King Solomon built the First Temple, a magnificent marvel; the First and Second Temple were then destroyed, but a portion of the Western Wall remains to this very day; and here is where Jesus walked in the Way of Suffering, Via Dolorosa, was crucified and then resurrected.

 

The Prophet Isaiah instructed and highlighted (66:10): “Rejoice with Jerusalem and be glad with her, all who love her!” the city “Jerusalem that is built as a city which is joined together” (Psalms 122:3) and which is remembered and constantly highlighted “If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth if I remember thee not, if I set not Jerusalem above my chiefest joy” (Psalms 137:5-6).

It is in this spirit, 50 years to the date from when the Israeli flag was raised over the Temple Mount, that Christians and Jews and other minorities will gather and declare:

 

There is no other place like Jerusalem, Jerusalem of Gold, the City of God!

Throughout the Middle East and Africa Christians and other minorities are being raped, sold to slavery, executed en masse (including Muslims in the hands of other Muslims) and murdered, and holy places (churches, mosques, etc.) are desecrated, burned to the ground and destroyed. Jerusalem is the only place where freedom of religion and protection of religious rights and institutions is by law and practice.

 

Jerusalem is the only place that for the past 50 years church bells can be heard, as well as the Muezzin call to prayer. Jews walk freely, living their daily lives side by side other minorities. Jerusalem is the only place in the entire region and beyond where the Christian population experiences a net positive growth; where minorities feel safe and welcome.

 

This is the theme being highlighted, under the banner “The City of Angels Saluting the City of God.” A unique evening celebrating a Jubilee of humanity flourishing.

##

For any inquiries, please contact Norma Zager, (323) 397-8752.

 

Among relevant questions are:

 

What is unique about Jerusalem?

What is unique about 2017?

 

This year marks

 

* the 120th anniversary of the First Zionist Congress in Basel,

* the 100th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration,

* the 70th year of the UN Partition Plan,

* the 50th anniversary of the Six Day War,

* and 50 years for the reunification of Jerusalem.]

What are the connections between LA and Jerusalem?

Why should one care?

 

1) Please include information about Jerusalem of Gold in your calendar of upcoming events.  RSVP can be done to jerusalemofgoldforall@gmail.com.

 

2) If you wish to write an article about the various milestones this year (vis-a-vis Israel and Jerusalem), or maybe about anti-Semitism today and re-living the 1930s, the spread of radical Islam or what is happening in the Middle East, and how is it all relevant for us here in the Greater Los Angeles area and in the USA, or if you are simply interested in Jerusalem and/or Israel, we are available provide background as well as pertinent, detailed. information.

 

Of particular significance during the event will be a recognition of Holocaust Survivors still with us and making a vow never to forget them.

 

You may want to place a small “CALL FOR HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS: to be honored during the upcoming Jerusalem of Gold event.  Please submit Survivors’ names to Vera Markowitz, (310) 276-7494.”

 

3) Please sign up to participate and let your colleagues, friends and family know:

 

Signing up is extremely easy.  Just click on the Eventbrite link:

 

 

https://www.eventbrite.com/e/jerusalem-of-gold-tickets-34574758032

 

4) If you intend to cover the event, please let us know.  Israeli diplomats will be there to welcome the guests, as well as faith leaders, elected officials and diplomats.  Jerusalem of Gold promises to be a most interesting event.

 

SHALOM!

 

Always,

Ari Bussel

bussel@me.com
USA +1 (310) 339-6686

 

Trump’s Truman moment


Intro to ‘Trump’s Truman moment

John R. Houk, Editor

Posted 5/19/17

 

Bob Eschliman writing for CharismaNews, introduces a Pastor John Hagee open letter posted at the Washington Times encouraging President Trump to deliver on his campaign promise to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This would be an act recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital City of the Jewish State. This is also an act that would alienate psycho-Islamic Supremacist nations and Multiculturalist-deluded European nations desiring to placate the oil rich Middle Eastern nations.

 

CharismaNews posted on May 18 while the open letter posted at Washington Times was posted on May 15. I am going to quote Eschliman’s intro as a quote and the Washington Times post in entirety. Eschliman posted three paragraphs. Two paragraphs in the beginning, followed by a partial of John Hagee’s open letter and finishing with a paragraph telling you to read the rest of the open letter. Here is the intro:

 

Pastor John Hagee, in his capacity as founder and chairman of Christians United For Israel, has written an open letter to President Donald Trump that was published Wednesday by The Washington Times.

 

In the letter, Hagee reminds the president of one of his predecessors, President Harry Truman, who faced a decisive moment where he had to choose between standing up for Israel or going with the wishes of the rest of the world. He said President Trump will face a similar test during his trip to the Middle East.

 

 

But, Hagee noted, the buck doesn’t stop with the bureaucrats—borrowing one of Truman’s most famous catchphrases—but at the Resolute Desk in the Oval Office. Click here to read the rest of the letter. (Pastor John Hagee: President Trump Will Soon Face a ‘Truman Moment’; By BOB ESCHLIMAN; CharismaNews; 5/18/17)

 

Pastor John Hagee

 

JRH 5/19/17

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Trump’s Truman moment

 

Attributed to Washington Times Staff

By Pastor John Hagee

May 15, 2017

Washington Times

 

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

 

In 1948, when President Truman recognized the newly independent state of Israel, he did so in the face of fierce opposition from his advisers. Secretary of State George C. Marshall — whom the president regarded as “the greatest living American” — adamantly opposed the decision.

 

Despite the controversy, it is now a source of a great pride for many Americans that our nation recognized Israel just minutes after it declared independence. Truman’s decision to choose morality over realpolitik, in defiance of his advisers, will forever be a focal point of American and Israeli history — and of Truman’s legacy.

 

President Trump will soon face a similar moment. In a few weeks, as mandated by the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, he will have to decide whether to exercise the legislation’s presidential waver or move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

 

Throughout his campaign, Mr. Trump promised to move the embassy. This promise was vital to securing the support of millions of Christian Zionists around the country, and Mr. Trump like Truman is hearing from naysayers. Moving the embassy will inflame the Arab world, they claim.

 

Also like Truman, Mr. Trump must contend with well-entrenched anti-Israel bureaucrats at the State Department who will try to use their positions to make moving the embassy difficult. But the buck does not stop with bureaucrats.

 

The Jewish state has the right to determine where it would place its capitol, and it has chosen Jerusalem. The international community’s decision to cower before Israel’s enemies by keeping embassies in Tel Aviv is disgraceful. For thousands of years, Jews around the world never forgot their holy city. From generation to generation they reiterated their hope that next year they would be in Jerusalem. In the days to come, I pray God grant Mr. Trump the wisdom of Solomon and the courage of Truman.

_______________

JOHN HAGEE

Founder, chairman

Christians United for Israel

San Antonio, Texas

 

All site contents © Copyright 2017 The Washington Times, LLC

 

Blog Editor removed WT topic links in the post. You can tell where the topic links are located by the bold text. The CUFI link was added by the Editor.

 

Despite UNESCO’s bias, Jews won’t abandon Israel’s holy Jewish sites


Two members of the Simon Wiesenthal Center writing for The Hill, deliver a scathing yet entirely correct article of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decision to rob Jews of their ancient heritage inherent in Israel as if that heritage never existed.

 

JRH 5/4/17

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Despite UNESCO’s bias, Jews won’t abandon Israel’s holy Jewish sites

 

 Western Wall Jewish Heritage

 

By RABBI ABRAHAM COOPER AND RABBI YITZCHOK ADLERSTEIN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS

05/03/17 05:20 PM EDT

The Hill

 

Forget fake news. UNESCO is promoting an entire fake universe.

 

Like so many other UN agencies with an assured anti-Israel majority, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) regularly votes to deny some aspect of Israel’s legitimacy. Their diplomatic machinations at UNESCO serves as the backbone of much of the Muslim world’s refusal to recognize the Jewish people’s historic links to Israel, the Holy Land.

 

To legitimate their denial of the past and today’s reality of a Jewish state with more than 8 million citizens, history itself must be re-written, holy sites rebranded. That’s where the Orwellian leveraging of the agency whose raison d’etre is supposed to be the protection of history and culture — not its eradication — comes into play.

 

UNESCO’s new resolution, timed to coincide with Israel’s 69th Independence Day on Tuesday, May 2, rejects Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem, including modern West Jerusalem.

 

The resolution passed with 22 nations supporting the measure, 10 opposing it, 23 countries abstaining, and three absent.

SimonWiesenthalCntr

@simonwiesenthal

It’s not just Trump, Europe forgets the Holocaust’s Jewish victims by Rabbi Abraham Cooper & Dr. Harold Brackman… http://fb.me/5sdBG0OuS 

 

In its text, Rachel’s Tomb and the Tomb of the Patriarchs where Abraham, Sarah, Isaac, Rivka, Jacob and Leah are buried were repackaged as Muslim mosques. To her credit, Irina Bokova, UNESCO’s Director-General, has been a consistent critic of the charade. “To deny, conceal, or erase any of the Jewish, Christian or Muslim traditions runs counter to the reasons that justified its inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage list,” she insisted last year. But Madam Bokova’s term shortly expiries and Israel’s opponents could soon have a firmer grip.

 

What is particularly galling was the role Germany reportedly played in enabling fellow European Union members to be free to support for this outrage.

 

If the German Foreign Minister or any other European diplomat thinks this cynical maneuver which further fuels dreams of an alternative universe sans Israelis will impact Jews in Israel or around the world, they are dead wrong.

 

Jerusalem is the heart of the Jewish people. Centuries ago, long before anyone heard of Mohammed, Jews understood the importance of the city that King David built and made his capital. They built two temples there, which became focal points for their religion and their peoplehood, maintaining that centrality, even in times that it lay in ruins. “If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand fail me,” spoke the prophet.

 

In their unparalleled, 2,000-year exile before returning home in modern times, Jews never left Jerusalem. A small group remained in the Holy Land throughout; the rest, scattered literally around the world, were united by the shared prayers offered three times a day for the return to Zion. Jews survived the Crusades, TorquemadaChmielnicki and Hitler without ever diluting their passion for Jerusalem.

The Israel Project

@israelproject

TIP President and CEO @JoshBlockDC: UNESCO can’t be allowed to deny Jewish link to Temple Mount http://buff.ly/2dEcFH8  via @thehill

 

The Jewish people will not abide by the ballot box stuffing of morally bankrupt regimes at UNESCO and they won’t forget when Arab were custodians of Jerusalem’s Old City, seized during the 1948 war of independence. Synagogues in the Old City were razed. Tombstones became latrines. Jews were barred from visiting holy sites. Christians took note of the mindset of the conquerors and reacted with horror at the thought that the Church of the Holy Sepulcher could become the next Palmyra.

 

Indeed, anyone concerned with the protection of educational, scientific, and cultural treasures of others, should look at Israel’s record. It may be the only country in the Middle East in recent years where the Christian population has consistently increased. The Jerusalem municipality gives out free Christmas trees to its Christian citizens each year. (If it only gave out one, that would be more than the number of Christians and Jews allowed to visit Mecca!) When different Christian sects come to blows occasionally over the administration of their holy sites, it is the Israeli police whom they call in to restore peace.

 

Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem is the only guarantee that holy places will be preserved for everyone.

 

Reality and mutual respect, not fantasy, are the first building blocks of trust and treaties. It is a toss-up as to who has done more damage with the latest UN Middle East fiasco — Arab regimes that continue to deny that the Jewish people has risen from the ashes, or dapper European diplomats who think they can still denigrate cowering Jews. Take note Berlin and Brussels. Those days are over.

 

The views expressed by contributors are their own and are not the views of The Hill.

 

__________________

Rabbi Abraham Cooper is Associate Dean of the Simon Wiesenthal Center. Rabbi Yitzchok Adlerstein is the Wiesenthal Center’s Director of Interfaith Relations.

 

THE HILL 1625 K STREET, NW SUITE 900 WASHINGTON DC 20006

 

| 202-628-8500 TEL | 202-628-8503 FAX

 

THE CONTENTS OF THIS SITE ARE ©2017 CAPITOL HILL PUBLISHING CORP., A SUBSIDIARY OF NEWS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

Media Goes Kumbaya For Hamas


Hamas is an Islamic terrorist organization attempting to schmooze Western support with duplicitous words that actually change nothing about Israel and Jews in general. Hamas published a revised version of their charter with deceptive moderated language.

 

JRH 5/3/17

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Media Goes Kumbaya For Hamas

 

By Simon Plosker

May 3, 2017

Honest Reporting

 

Lipstick Pig

 

At a news conference held in Qatar, Hamas presented its new manifesto in a clear attempt to make itself more palatable to a Western audience as well as so-called moderate Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

 

Writing for CNN, Jonathan Cristol says:

 

“The new document may seem more moderate, but in reality nothing has changed. While the document accepts the 1967 borders as a “national consensus formula,” and you are sure to see breathless praise for this “change,” Hamas still calls for the “full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea,” which is poetic code for “the destruction of Israel.”

 

On Jerusalem it says, “Not one stone of Jerusalem can be surrendered or relinquished.” Hamas still rejects not only the admittedly failed Oslo Accords, but also the recognition of Israel and the renunciation of violence. Indeed it calls “armed resistance” the “strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people.”

 

The new document allows Hamas to claim moderation and to seek out new allies alienated by the religious struggle depicted in its original charter. But make no mistake: The new charter does not mean that Hamas will make any change in either its strategy, tactics, or its demands.

 

It has “moderated” its position, but it is not moderate. It must continue to be fought against and to be rejected, just as it rejects the right of Israel to live in peace and security.

 

Click here to sign our petition and call on the media to stop whitewashing Hamas.

 

Some media, however, appear to have gone kumbaya for Hamas, including the claim that Hamas is no longer calling for Israel’s destruction.

 

The Wall Street Journal:

 

 

The Financial Times:

 

 

The Independent:

 

Then there’s the utterly incredulous suggestion that Hamas is somehow interested in any sort of peace process with Israel.

 

Bloomberg:

 

International Business Times:

 

 

The Irish Times:

 

 

You can put lipstick on a pig but it is still a pig.

 

Hamas is still a terrorist organization committed to Israel’s destruction through the use of violence and terror.

 

Click here to sign our petition and call on the media to stop whitewashing Hamas.

 

_______________

Copyright © 2017 by HonestReporting

 

About Honest Reporting

 

HonestReporting monitors the news for bias, inaccuracy, or other breach of journalistic standards in coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also facilitates accurate reporting for foreign journalists covering the region. HonestReporting is not aligned with any government or political party or movement.

 

HonestReporting believes that a fully informed public is essential to progress and understanding in conflict resolution. It is not enough to correct inaccurate reporting and expose breaches of journalistic ethics. HonestReporting, through its MediaCentral project, provides support services for journalists based in or visiting Israel, the Palestinian territories, and the region to insure the free flow of information.

 

HonestReporting’s work serves the public interest by fighting misinformation, such as computer manipulations of images that give people a false impression of the conflict. At the same time, it provides agenda-free services to reporters, including translation services and access to news makers to enable them to provide a fuller picture of the situation. Honestreporting has over 140,000 subscribers and its MediaCentral project handles over 1,000 inquiries from journalists each year.